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Abstract
Background
Effective response to emerging infectious disease (EID) threats relies on health care sys-
tems that can detect and contain localised outbreaks before they reach a national or interna-
tional scale. The Asia-Pacific region contains low and middle income countries in which the
risk of EID outbreaks is elevated and whose health care systemsmay require international
support to effectively detect and respond to such events. The absence of comprehensive
data on populations, health care systems and disease characteristics in this regionmakes
risk assessment and decisions about the provision of such support challenging.
Methodology/principalfindings
We describe a mathematicalmodelling framework that can inform this process by integrat-
ing available data sources, systematically explore the effects of uncertainty, and provide
estimates of outbreak risk under a range of intervention scenarios.We illustrate the use of
this framework in the context of a potential importationof Ebola Virus Disease into the Asia-
Pacific region. Results suggest that, across a wide range of plausible scenarios, preemptive
interventions supporting the timely detection of early cases provide substantially greater
reductions in the probability of large outbreaks than interventions that support health care
system capacity after an outbreak has commenced.
Conclusions/significance
Our study demonstrates how, in the presence of substantial uncertaintyabout health care
system infrastructureand other relevant aspects of disease control, mathematicalmodels
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can be used to assess the constraints that limited resources place upon the ability of local
health care systems to detect and respond to EID outbreaks in a timely and effective fash-
ion. Our framework can help evaluate the relative impact of these constraints to identify
resourcing priorities for health care system support, in order to inform principled and quanti-
fiable decision making.
Author Summary
Low and middle income countries face a serious challenge when confronting emerging
infectious disease (EID) threats. Their risk of experiencing outbreaks can be greater than
in many high income countries, while their capacity to respond effectivelymay be con-
strained by competing demands on limited health care system resources. The globalised
nature of health security argues for international support to improve local health care sys-
tems, but limited data makes risk assessment and decisionmaking difficult.We propose a
mathematical modelling framework that can help explore a variety of outbreak and inter-
vention scenarios. Our framework can assist with the identification of constraints that
limit the ability of local health care systems to detect and respond to EID outbreaks in a
timely and effective fashion, and assess the relative importance of these constraints to help
establish priorities for health care system support. We illustrate the use of our framework
by considering the importation of Ebola into the Asia-Pacific region, with results empha-
sising the critical role played by effective surveillance in controlling localised outbreaks.
Introduction
The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak inWest Africa highlighted the ongoing threat to
global health posed by emerging infectious diseases (EIDs). As the outbreak waned, attention
has turned towards the lessons to be learned for future EID preparedness and response [1]. In
particular, the prolonged delay in international response reinforced the importance of ensuring
that local health care systems are capable of detecting and responding to localised outbreaks
before they reach epidemic proportions [2,3].
The prospect of EID outbreaks in low and middle income countries raises particular con-
cerns and challenges for global health agencies. The risk of emergence of novel pathogens in
many of these countries is elevated [4], and there may be limited capacity to mount an effec-
tive response [5]. Greater global connectivity increases both the risks and international
consequences of EID outbreaks in these countries [6]. In consequence, there is a growing rec-
ognition that health security is a shared responsibility and that supporting health care sys-
tems capacity in low and middle income countries is a necessary step towards improving
global health security.
A significant challenge facing international health agencies responding to EID outbreaks in
the Asia-Pacific region is the scarcity of data required for risk assessment and decisionmaking
[5,7]. These challenges are compounded when attempting to formulate plans prior to an out-
break occurring,when epidemiological data relevant to a specific countrymay not exist or be
readily available to researchers, policymakers and response personnel. Despite these chal-
lenges, analysing potential outbreak risks is essential for timely decisionmaking about effective
preparedness and response strategies.
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Here we demonstrate how mathematical modelling can support risk assessment and deci-
sion making about preparedness for and response to an EID outbreak [8], focusing on the role
of health care system support and behavioural interventions in outbreak control. We illustrate
this application of mathematical modelling using the potential importation of an active EVD
case into the Asia-Pacific region as a case study. Although no such importation has occurred to
date, the risk has been recognised [9], prompting consideration of the likelihoodof an outbreak
occurring and evaluating alternative preparedness and response strategies. Furthermore, other
viral haemorrhagic fevers—both external to the Asia-Pacific region, such as Marburg virus dis-
ease [10] and Lassa fever [11], and those already present, such as Nipah virus [12]–may have
similar pandemic potential to EVD, and the model framework introduced here would be
directly applicable.
We show how to use this framework, in the face of uncertainty, to identify key drivers of
outbreak controllability and the most effective resourcing strategies to enhance preparedness
and response. Our results suggest that early detection and ongoing ascertainment of cases have
the most substantial impact on controllability across a wide range of demographic, health care
system and intervention scenarios. However, we show how priorities for health care system
support depend upon the local context. We compare our findings to results from qualitative
assessments of EVD risk undertaken by WHO [13,14], and conclude by discussing the implica-
tions for EVD preparedness in particular, and the broader utility of mathematical modelling
for EID risk assessment and decisionmaking in data-poor scenarios.
The 2014–2015West AfricanEbola virus disease outbreak
EVD was first identified in Zaire in 1976 and there have since been at least twenty-five out-
breaks in Africa. The 2014 West African outbreak—first reported in Guinea and subsequently
becoming established in Liberia and Sierra Leone—is the largest to date. Symptoms of EVD
include vomiting, diarrhoea and haemorrhaging, and transmission occurs via direct contact
with blood and other bodily fluids. It is characterised by an incubation period of up to three
weeks during which onward transmission is unlikely, followed by increasingly severe symp-
toms and associated infectiousness. Case fatality rates are high, and improperly buried bodies
represent an ongoing source of infection [15]. In the absence of widely available pharmaceuti-
cal measures for treatment or prevention during the 2014 West African outbreak, control
efforts centred around identification and isolation of cases, tracing of known contacts, and
hygienic burial of people who died from EVD.
Unlike previous outbreaks, which were largely confined to rural areas, the 2014 West Afri-
can outbreak spread to urban regions, which contributed to the greater number of cases: official
estimates are approximately 28,000 cases with over 11,000 deaths, although such numbers may
have underestimated the truemagnitude [16]. Health care workers were disproportionately
represented among cases and the full costs of the outbreak in terms of the impact on health
infrastructure are still being realised [2]. During the outbreak, there was considerable interna-
tional concern about the potential for the global transmission of EVD, heightened by the
appearance of cases in Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America [17].
The Asia-Pacific region
Modern patterns of global transport mean that no country is isolated from the risk of disease
importation, as demonstrated by the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 influenza in 2009 [18].
The Asia-Pacific region is of particular concern, with Southeast Asia termed a ‘hotspot’ for
EIDs due to social and environmental factors supporting the evolution and transmission of
novel pathogens [5].
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The considerable diversity—geographic, demographic, cultural and economic—of Asia-
Pacific countries means that risks associated with EIDs will vary greatly across the region, both
between and within countries (Fig 1). Differences in health care system funding, access and
infrastructurewill influence capacity to detect and respond to EID outbreaks, as evidencedby
Fig 1. Population and health care systemdiversity in Southeast Asia and theWestern Pacific. (A)Population density
ranges from less than 1 person per square kilometre in partsof Papua New Guinea and Indonesia to over 6,800 people per
square kilometre in Singapore. Data obtained fromCenter for International EarthScience Information Network (CIESIN),
ColumbiaUniversity (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw). (B)Number of health care workers per thousand population
ranges from 1.2 in Cambodia to 11.5 in Brunei Darussalam. Data obtained fromGlobal Health Observatory data repository
(http://apps.who.int/gho/data/).
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g001
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recent experience of avian influenzaH5N1, pandemic influenzaH1N1 and severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS).
Many countries in this region are understudied with respect to their health infrastructure
and there is a poor understanding of their response capacity in the event of an EID outbreak.
World Health Organization (WHO) regional offices in theWestern Pacific (WPRO) and
South East Asia (SEARO) have assessed the need to build national capacities to undertake sur-
veillance, infection prevention and control, and public health emergency preparedness [19].
Annual assessments of these capacities are self-reported, and provide only a general statement
of accomplishment [20].
The risks associated with EVD spreading to Southeast Asia were recognisedduring the 2014
West African outbreak [9]. In addition to global air passenger flows, specific vectors of risk
included the presence of miners and aid workers in West Africa with family ties to various
countries in Southeast Asia. In September 2014, WHO regional offices undertook a rapid
assessment of EVD virus preparedness across countries in the region, followed by a simulation
exercise to train public health staff. A risk assessment for EVD infection in the region was
undertaken using theWHO guidance for rapid risk assessment of acute public health events
[14]. In addition, and of particular relevance to potential risks, forty health professionals from
India and Bangladesh participated in teams supporting outbreak control in West Africa, as
well as staff from Pacific Island Countries through theWest Pacific Ebola Support Team [20].
Despite the ongoing efforts by WHO, the EVD preparedness review identified that all thir-
teen surveyedAsian countries, but only nine of thirteen surveyedPacific Island countries, had
health facilities designated to isolate suspected or confirmed cases. Only two of the Pacific
Island countries surveyed reported adequate supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE)
for EVD response and containment. In addition, EVD surveillanceprotocols had been devel-
oped and disseminated in all but one of thirteenAsian countries, but only two of thirteen
Pacific countries [13,21].
In the presence of competing demands for attention and resources, there is a risk that efforts
to improve health policies and systems will be reactive and transient in nature [9]. This rein-
forces the importance of ongoing support from international and regional organisations, such
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) andWHO, but identifying the most
effective forms of such support across this diverse region is a formidable challenge.
Modelling of infectious diseases
Mathematical modelling can be a powerful tool to inform decisionmaking in data-poor scenar-
ios [22,23]. Models can incorporate data that is available from a range of quantitative and
qualitative epidemiological and sociological sources. Even when precise predictions are not
possible, models can provide ‘best estimates’ that enable decisionmakers to rapidly evaluate
alternative outbreak, surveillance and response scenarios. The process of constructing a mathe-
matical model requires assumptions about drivers of disease transmission to be made explicit,
aiding transparency. Uncertainties in current knowledge can be incorporated into parameter
estimates, and can help to provide estimates of the risk of various possible outcomes [24–26].
Finally, mathematical models can enable identification and prioritisation of key data require-
ments, providing arguments and evidence to guide future data collection efforts.
Mathematical models were used extensively during the 2014 West African EVD outbreak
[27], including in the early stages when there was considerable uncertainty around disease
activity. A key aim was to project the possible course of the outbreak and assess the potential
effectiveness of alternative interventions withinWest Africa [28–33]. Models were also used to
estimate the risk of global transmission [34,35].
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Methods
We usedmathematical modelling to explore hypothetical scenarios that might result if an
active EVD case were to be imported to the Asia-Pacific. The two key questions motivating the
construction of our model were:
1. If an active EVD case travelled from an infected country to the Asia-Pacific region, what is
the risk of an outbreak subsequently occurring?
2. What are the key health care system constraints that limit the ability of a local health care
system to detect and respond to an EVD outbreak in a timely fashion and what type of inter-
national intervention would most effectively address these constraints?
To construct a model capable of addressing these questions, the following data requirements
were identified:
1. characteristics of EVD relevant to infection transmission (disease characteristics);
2. demographic, sociological and behavioural characteristics of the target populations relevant
to the transmission of EVD, and their variation across the region (population
characteristics);
3. the current capacity of local health care systems to detect and respond to importation and
transmission of EVD, and their variation across the region (health care system characteris-
tics); and
4. plausible interventions to support local health care systems to detect and respond to impor-
tation and transmission of EVD (interventions).
These data requirements are addressed in the following subsections.We then describe
appropriate outcome measures given the data-poor situation of interest, and outline the spe-
cific scenarios explored in this paper.
Disease characteristics
The natural history of EVD has been well characterised from previous outbreaks, and disease
characteristics such as the basic reproduction number and the duration of the latent and infec-
tious periodswere therefore available from previous epidemiological studies [15].
We used a stochastic SEIR-type model (Fig 2), with the addition of compartments for the
number of unburied dead bodies (which form a significant source of transmission, if there
are interactions with the dead body, as is common in various funeral rites) and the number
of safely buried dead bodies (assumed to no longer contribute to transmission). All individu-
als are initially susceptible to infection (S). Once infected, they enter a latent incubation
stage (E), from which they transition to become infectious, but not yet symptomatic (I0). At
the point of developing symptoms (I), their infectiousness increases. Post-infection, individ-
uals either recover and are no longer infectious (R) or die and remain infectious (D) until
buried (B).
We also introduced a compartment (H) for individuals who have become symptomatic and
are visible to the health care system. Separating these visible (i.e., ascertained) cases from the
remaining, undetected cases (I) allows the model to incorporate actions such as case isolation
(thereby decreasing their ability to infect others) and the provision of treatment (thereby
decreasing their risk of dying). Full details of the model are provided in Model description in
S1 Methods.
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Population characteristics
While many socio-cultural factors may influence the frequency and intensity of contact
between individuals that facilitate the spread of infection, we used a simple distinction between
rural and urban populations that proved to be an important determinant of EVD transmission
[29]. We distinguish rural and urban populations in the model by allowingmore transmission
from infectious individuals in urban populations than in rural populations.
Another key driver of EVD transmission is the frequency and intensity of contact between
healthy individuals and infectious dead bodies as a consequence of burial practices, which may
vary according to the dominant religion. For example, Islamic practices include burying the
dead body as soon as possible, while in non-Islamic regions the burial may be delayed for a
number of days in order to give distant family members time to visit the deceased.Other cul-
tural traditions may also facilitate substantial transmission after death, such as the Papua New
Guinean ritual of ‘haus krai’, where the body is typically returned to the home village for burial,
after which the extended family and friends gather for a wake that can continue for many days.
Funerals and burials have been recognised as potential ‘super-spreading’ events [36], which
may result in a substantially greater than expected number of secondary cases [37]. The fre-
quency of these events may therefore influence the likelihoodof an outbreak occurring.
In the model, we characterised the different burial practices by the mean duration of the
pre-burial period (i.e., the average delay between death and burial) and the daily force of infec-
tion exerted by dead bodies (i.e., the degree of interaction between healthy individuals and the
body). The parameter values were informed by expert knowledge of burial customs (where
available), by knowledge of the dominant religions in a given region, and from estimates of the
force of infection from theWest African outbreak.
Health care system characteristics
A country’s health care system includes people and institutions responsible and resources
available for disease surveillance—caseascertainment and contact tracing—and isolation and
treatment of detected cases.
Surveillance capacity was represented in the model by two distinct quantities: the number of
transmission events that occurred prior to the first detected case; and the case ascertainment
probability of subsequent symptomatic cases. Limited contact tracing was also included, allow-
ing some contacts of identified cases to bemonitored and therefore experience a higher proba-
bility of being identified should they subsequently become infected.
Fig 2. The Ebolamodel.The natural historyof infection comprises susceptibility (S), exposure (E) at a rate determinedby the force of
infection β and the current prevalence of infectious individuals and unburied dead bodies. Exposed individuals progress to mild
infectiousness prior to developing symptoms (I0) at rate σ, and symptomatic infection (I) at rate γ0, followed by either death (D) or recovery
(R) at rate γ1. The proportionof infections leading to death or recovery is informedby estimates of the case fatality ratio (CFR). Dead bodies
remain infectious prior to burial (B) at rate τ. Ascertainment of cases (with probability pasc) allows symptomatic individuals to be hospitalised
in isolationwards (H), which reduces their contribution to transmission and increases their probability of recovery. Full equations describing
the model are provided in Model description in S1Methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g002
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We used the additional model compartment (H) to represent the isolation of identified
cases in hospital isolation wards, as depicted in Fig 2. Hospital isolation was assumed to pre-
vent onward transmission and to increase survival probability. Hospital isolation and contact
tracing were both subject to capacity constraints imposed by limited resource and workforce
availability.
We also stratified the model population into health care workers (HCWs) and the general
community, to allow differential risks of exposure and case ascertainment. Prior to the first
detected case, HCWs were assumed to experience a greater risk of exposure than the general
community, due to close contact in medical settings and a lack of recognition of the need for
special precautions. Subsequent to the first detected case, HCWs were assumed to experience a
lower risk of exposure than the general community, due to the adoption of appropriate infec-
tion control measures. At this stage, any cases among HCWs were assumed to be automatically
detected.
This stratification also explicitly captured the impact of the availability of the health care
workforce (i.e., uninfectedHCWs, assumed to be capable of providing health services) on
health care capacity. Depletion of this workforce (due to infection) was assumed to reduce the
provision of case ascertainment, contact tracing and monitoring, and case isolation. Specifi-
cally, only 50% of health care capacities were assumed to be available when 90% of the HCWs
were available, and no health care capacities were available once 80% or less of the HCWs
remained available (see Fig 2 in S1 Methods). These values are in broad agreement with the
observed impact on health care systems in Sierra Leone, where HCWmortality of around 20%
was accompanied by substantial loss of trust in the health care system, substantial decreases in
all-cause consultations and admissions and health care productivity and effectivenesswas
diminished amongst both employed and volunteer personnel [38].
The health care systems of Asia-Pacific countries are characterised by diversity in their level
of development. Access to, and standards of, health care services can also vary substantially
within a single country. While data on hospital capacity and size of the health care workforce
was available, for some countries information on the geographical distribution of these
resources was limited.We made two broad assumptions in calibrating our model: that health
care system resources were more likely to be concentrated in urban centres, and that the
remaining health care system resources were distributed within countries proportional to pop-
ulation density.
Interventions
Several strategies for boosting the existing surveillance and health care capacity were identified
as practical and potentially effective:
1. Enhanced syndromic disease surveillance in the general population, leading to an improved
likelihood of case ascertainment.
2. Provision of additional isolation wards and health care workers; and provision of personal
protective equipment (PPE) to reduce transmission within the household during home-
based quarantine [29,39].
These interventions were represented by increasing the case ascertainment probability of
cases in the general community, and by increasing the available capacities for contact monitor-
ing and hospital isolation.
In addition to medical interventions, changes to social behaviours and cultural practices can
reduce the force of infection in the community [15,40,41].We identified two behavioural
Model-InformedRisk Assessment for Emerging Infectious Diseases
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interventions to reduce the force of infection in the community, based on evidence of success
in theWest African outbreak and in other infectious disease outbreaks:
1. Reducing interaction with dead bodies, by adopting changes in funeral rites, burial practices,
and the storage of dead bodies prior to burial. This was represented by decreasing the daily
force of infection from unburied bodies and by decreasing the delay between death and
burial.
2. Reducing infection from infectious individuals in the community by enhancing hygiene
practices in the community (e.g., hand washing, use of face masks, and other practices that
reduce exposure to bodily fluids). This was represented by decreasing the daily force of
infection experiencedby the general community.
In response to a perceived potential EID threat, it might be possible to deliver an interven-
tion prior to an actual outbreak occurring,while responding to an observedoutbreak would
necessarily involve some delay. It is therefore critical to identify how the requiredmagnitude of
an intervention to reach an “acceptable” probability of outbreak control depends upon the tim-
ing of that intervention.
In our sensitivity analysis, we explored how both themagnitude and the timing of these
interventions affected the population experience of disease. Intervention timing (“delay”) was
defined as the time at which the increased capacities and/or decreased forces of infectionwere
realised, relative to the time at which the first identified case was detected. Accordingly, a delay
of zero weeks meant that the intervention was deployed prior to the first case being identified.
The first identified case was defined relative to the cumulative number of infectious individuals
that became symptomatic (i.e., transitioned to the I model compartment).
Outcomemeasures
In the absence of a health care response the distribution of outbreak sizes was bimodal, consis-
tent with classic results from stochastic infection theory [42]. Around a quarter of the model
simulations produced outbreaks of 16 cases or fewer, representing stochastic fade-out of the
disease. The remaining simulations yielded outbreaks with attack rates of around 80%, repre-
senting uncontrolled outbreaks. While high, it is important to note that these attack rates cor-
respond to the hypothetical scenario in which there is no health care system or social response
to the outbreak. An attack rate of 80% is consistent with theoretical estimates for an infectious
disease of equivalent transmissibility to that estimated for EVD (i.e., a basic reproduction num-
ber of around 2), and with observed epidemic behaviour early in theWest African outbreak
[28].
The variety and complexity of output that a diseasemodel provides (such as the final size
distribution) can be both overwhelming and inappropriate in a decision support context.
Accordingly, we established a qualitative measure to assess the outcome of an epidemic based
on its final size (see Fig 3 for example outcomes):
Fade-out (green). For any infectious disease, when very few cases are present in a population,
it is possible that these individuals will recover or die before the infection spreads further,
and the outbreak will be self-limiting.
Controlled (orange).A controlled outbreak is one that would have been uncontrolled in the
absence of local response or intervention (that is, it would not have been expected to fade
out of its own accord), but whose final size was greatly diminished due to a local response or
intervention.
Model-InformedRisk Assessment for Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Uncontrolled (red).An uncontrolled outbreak is one in which the local response measures or
external interventions have limited impact on the course of the epidemic compared with the
‘no intervention’ scenario, as assessed by the final attack rate in the population.
We classified epidemics according to the above measure, as illustrated in Fig 4. The left
panel illustrates the situation in the absence of a response, where outbreaks either fade out or
are uncontrolled. The right panel demonstrates how the response has little effect on outbreaks
that would have faded out of their own accord, but greatly reduces the impact of a proportion
Fig 3. Time series of diseaseprevalence for three example simulations.These three examples demonstrate the three possible
categories of epidemic outcome: stochastic fade-out, a controlled outbreak, and an uncontrolledoutbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g003
Fig 4. The classification of epidemicoutcomes. In the absence of a health care response, EVD
importation may result in zero or very few secondary cases (green, left panel) or may result in a large,
uncontrolled epidemic (red, left panel). A health care response may mitigate some of these uncontrolled
epidemics by greatly reducing their final size (yellow, right panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g004
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of previously uncontrolled outbreaks. The distribution of outbreak sizes remained bimodal,
with 96% of simulations resulting in fewer than 500 cases (fade-out and controlled epidemics)
or attack rates of around 80% (uncontrolled epidemics). Accordingly, we used a threshold of
1,000 cases to distinguish between controlled and uncontrolled epidemics.
Scenarios
Since the natural history of EVD was known to be well-characterised and stable, we were able
to identify appropriate parameter values for the disease characteristics (15). For the remaining
parameters, related to the proposed intervention strategies, we derived broad estimates and
performed sensitivity analyses. Because disease transmission is highly stochastic in nature
when there are a small number of cases, it was critical to use a stochastic transmission model.
This meant that there was no single representative outbreak for a single scenario. Accordingly,
for each scenario we performed 1,000 simulations to estimate the probability of each outcome.
In each of the results figures, we use a stacked bar for each scenario to represent the percent-
age of these simulations that were categorised as resulting in each of the three outcomes defined
above (fade-out, controlled or uncontrolled). The baselinemodel behaviour, in the absence of
any health care system response, is that all outbreaks either fade-out or are uncontrolled.
A particular country or region of interest was represented by a subset of the parameter val-
ues that best represented its (assumed) capacities and behavioural practices. To understand
how this local context affected the probability of controlling an EVD outbreak, we performed a
sensitivity analysis to identify how interventions might affect the probability of controlling an
EVD outbreak in that country or region. For all scenarios reported below, we also explored the
effects of the first identified case being the 5th, 10th, 25th or 50th symptomatic individual. Full
parameter values for all scenarios are provided in the Simulation scenarios in S1 Methods.
Results
As outlined in the Scenarios Section, the results represent an exploration of how variation in a
region’s local response capacity, and additional interventions (either health care system sup-
port or behavioural modification) affect the controllability of an outbreak. We then use Papua
New Guinea as a case study of these scenarios in the context of a specific health care system.
Variation in local response capacity
To estimate the impact of endogenous response capacity on control, we varied the case ascer-
tainment probability and size of the health care system, comprising the size of the health care
workforce and level of available isolation and contact tracing facilities.
The most salient conclusion is the simultaneous importance of early detection and high sub-
sequent ascertainment (Fig 5). A larger health care capacity can mitigate the failure of early
detection, but only to a limited degree. Controlled outbreaks only occurmore frequently than
uncontrolled outbreaks when case ascertainment is 80% or higher, regardless of health care
capacity.
Intervening to support a health care system response
To estimate the merits of providing additional support for a health response, we considered
two types of interventions: increasing case ascertainment (i.e., surveillance) and increasing
health care capacities.
Reactively increasing case ascertainment after the first detected case, from a baseline of
20% to 100% (Fig 6) demonstrates the simultaneous importance of early detection and high
Model-InformedRisk Assessment for Emerging Infectious Diseases
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ascertainment; both qualities are critical for outbreak control and the provision of one is not a
substitute for a lack of the other. When the first case is detected early (e.g., the fifth actual case,
“FD = 5”), the probability of outbreak control is 88% when case ascertainment is perfect for the
duration of the outbreak. If, however, perfect case ascertainment is only achieved four weeks
after the first detected case, the probability of outbreak control falls to 35%.
In contrast, where health care resources are limited, a boost in health care capacity may
instead be required to increase the probability of outbreak control. As shown in Fig 7, the impor-
tance of early detection remains paramount (i.e., to trigger a rapid health care response), but the
Fig 5. Effect of local responsecapacity. Epidemic outcomes as a function of case ascertainment (x-axis), subject to the first detected
case (FD) and the health care system capacity (small: 0.1% of population are HCWs;medium: 0.2% of population are HCWs; large: 0.3% of
population are HCWs; 1:15 ratio of HCWs to bed capacity, 1:50 ratio of HCWs to contact-tracing capacity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g005
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time at which the health care capacity is boosted is less important. This is in stark contrast to
boosting case ascertainment, and reflects the ability of the existing health care system to respond
effectively until the outbreak reaches a critical size. As long as the additional capacity is delivered
before this critical size is reached, the impact of the intervention will not be diminished
Intervening to modify behaviour
Reducing the force of infection from dead bodies substantially increases the likelihoodof control
in all scenarios (Fig 8). However, earlier detection of the first case provides greater time in which
Fig 6. Effect of increasedcase ascertainment.Startingwith a baseline case ascertainment of 20%, this figure shows the effect of
boosting ascertainment to 100% (i.e., perfect detection) at different times after the first detected case. This clearly shows the simultaneous
importanceof early detection and high ascertainment; provision of one is not a substitute for lack of the other.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g006
Model-InformedRisk Assessment for Emerging Infectious Diseases
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to prepare and deliver an effective reactive intervention. The later the first detection occurs, the
more critical it becomes to deliver the intervention rapidly. When the first detection is the fifth
actual case (“FD = 5”) a delay of 4 weeks before burial practices are changed reduces the likeli-
hood of control from 89% to 78%, but when the first detection is the twenty-fifth actual case
(“FD = 25”) a delay of 4 weeks before burial practices are changed reduces this from 45% to 23%.
Fig 7. Effect of improved health care systemcapacity. Startingwith a baseline case ascertainment of 80% and a small health care
system (0.1%of population are HCWs, 1:15 and 1:50 ratio of bed and contact-tracing capacities to HCWs, as above), this figure shows the
effect of doubling both the health care capacity and the health care workforce at different times after the first detected case. This increase in
capacity represents the transition from a small health care system to a mediumhealth care system, as defined in Fig 5. This clearly shows
the importance of early detection; the time delay in delivering the additional capacity is less important over this timescale of 0–8 weeks,
because the existing health care system is capable of accommodating patients in the early stage of the outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g007
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As expected, reducing the force of infection from both dead bodies and from infectious
individuals in the community has a dramatic effect on disease transmission and substantially
increases the likelihoodof control (Fig 9). However, even the impact of this intervention is sub-
stantially reduced by late detection and delayed delivery.
Fig 8. Effect of reducing force of infection from dead bodies.Startingwith a baseline case ascertainment of 70% and a small health
care system (0.1%of population are HCWs, 1:15 and 1:50 ratio of bed and contact-tracing capacities to HCWs, as above), this figure shows
the effect of reducing the force of infection from dead bodies (βD) by 25%. This represents a sociocultural intervention that changes burial
practices, as conducted in previous Ebola outbreaks and the temporary storage of dead bodies in the 2009 cholera outbreak in Papua New
Guinea. Reducing the force of infection (whether directly or indirectly) will decrease the epidemic burden, but the likelihood of controlling the
epidemic is strongly affected by the speed with which such an interventioncan be delivered. Success requires both early detection and a
rapid response from the community.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g008
Model-InformedRisk Assessment for Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Results in context: Papua New Guinea
We now demonstrate how the above results can be interpreted with respect to a specific coun-
try in the Asia Pacific region. Papua New Guinea (PNG) was chosen as a suitable exemplar for
several reasons. The Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED) data demonstrated
generally lower levels of capacity among Pacific Island countries [19]. Although PNG’s Human
Development Index (HDI) (0.505 in 2014) is slightly higher than that of EVD-affectedWest
Fig 9. Effect of reducing force of infection from community transmission. Startingwith a baseline case ascertainment of 70% and a
small health care system (0.1%of population are HCWs, 1:15 and 1:50 ratio of bed and contact-tracing capacities to HCWs, as above), this
figure shows the effect of reducing the force of infection from dead bodies (βD) and in the community (βI) by 25%. This represents a
sociocultural intervention that changes both burial practices and social mixing in the community. Similar to Fig 7, success of such an
intervention relies upon early detection and a rapid response from the community.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g009
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African countries (0.411 in Guinea, 0.413 in Sierra Leone and 0.43 in Liberia), it is the lowest
ranked country in the Southeast Asia/West Pacific region, and among the lowest ranked coun-
tries globally. Therefore, estimates of health care system and population factors relevant to dis-
ease transmission are likely to be comparable. The geographic proximity of PNG to Australia
and Australia’s existing engagement in PNGmake it likely that Australia would be called on to
support the response to any outbreak in PNG [43].
First, we divided the country into high-level administrative regions (listed in Table 1) and
used population sizes as reported in the 2011 census [44]. Estimates of hospital bed and health
care worker numbers were provided by country experts at the Nossal Institute for Global
Health (University of Melbourne, Australia), who suggested that no more than 10% of beds
could be used for isolation of EVD cases.We also assumed a (modest) national contact-tracing
capacity of 100 contacts per day. We allocated national hospital beds to Port Moresby and dis-
tributed remaining beds (regional and provincial hospitals) among the administrative regions
in proportion to their population densities, as a proxy for both population size and health care
system accessibility. The health care workforce and contact-tracing capacity were allocated
among regions in proportion to their designated bed capacities. From these data, we estimate
that the Port Moresby region has a medium health care system (almost 0.2% of the population
are health care workers), that the Islands region has a small health care system (almost 0.1%
are health care workers), and the remaining regions have even less health care infrastructure.
While Port Moresby is the largest city in Papua New Guinea and the commercial centre of
the country, the vast majority of the population live elsewhere, and country experts at the Nos-
sal Institute also advised that residents of Port Moresby frequently visit friends and relatives in
rural regions upon return from international travel. Accordingly, it was judged pertinent to
consider the probability of outbreak control in each of the regions.We assumed that the force
of infection in the community was twice as high in Port Moresby (highly urbanised population)
than in the other regions (with population densities 100 times lower than Port Moresby), and
that the average time to burial following death was 3 days, allowing for the return of bodies to
the home village for burial.
To estimate the case ascertainment proportion in Papua New Guinea, we consulted a variety
of data sources and also referred back to the EVD outbreak inWest Africa. Despite the high
proportion of EVD cases that are symptomatic, early in theWest African outbreak it was esti-
mated that only about 40% of all cases sought clinical care [16]. Papua New Guinea has a low
HDI ranking similar to those of theWest African nations, and faces similar challenges in pro-
viding access to and quality of health care services.These challenges include: very few health
professionals (less than 1 doctor per 10,000 people), insufficient health workforce in rural areas
(more than 80% of medical officers work in urban areas, despite 87.5% of the population living
in rural areas), low levels of workforce retention in rural areas (due to remoteness, financial
instability, and dangerous environments), limited availability of basic essential medical
Table 1. The administrative regionsof Papua NewGuinea. We separate Port Moresby (the largest city and national capital) from the rest of the Southern
(“Papua”) region on the grounds that Port Moresby comprisesa muchmore urbanised population than the rest of the region.
Region Population Type IsolationBeds Contact Tracing HCWs %HCWs
Port Moresby 365,000 Urban 60 15 711 0.195%
Southern 1,091,250 Rural 24 6 279 0.026%
Highlands 2,854,874 Rural 193 50 2290 0.080%
Momase 1,867,657 Rural 57 15 672 0.036%
Islands 741,538 Rural 56 14 669 0.090%
Total 390 100 4621
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.t001
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supplies, and lack of access to clean water in many facilities [45]. Given these issues of access
and provision, we assumed that case ascertainment in Papua New Guinea was unlikely to be
higher than in theWest African outbreak (40–50%) and, particularly in rural areas, might be
substantially lower (10–20%).
With clear evidence of successful behavioural interventions in Papua New Guinea during
the recent 2009 cholera outbreak as reported in [41], we anticipated that the force of infection
in the community and from dead bodies could be substantially reduced once an EVD case was
identified in the community. The geographic spread of the rural population (on the order of 10
people per square kilometre) and the inaccessibility of the Highlands region suggest that rapid
delivery of additional isolation beds, health care workers, and enhanced contact tracingmight
be impractical outside of Port Moresby.
In the densely populated urban setting of Port Moresby, controlled outbreaks are only likely
under two sets of circumstances (see Fig 10). The first is when the first case is detected early,
subsequent case ascertainment is high, and behavioural interventions reduce transmission in
the community. The second is when case ascertainment is high and behavioural interventions
reduce transmission in the community and also from dead bodies. In contrast, in the more
sparsely populated rural settings, such as the Southern region, controlled outbreaks are likely
when case ascertainment is high even in the absence of any behavioural interventions (see Fig
11). In these rural settings, behavioural interventions can greatly increase the likelihoodof con-
trolling outbreaks even when case ascertainment is very low, and the synergistic effects of
reducing transmission in the community and also from dead bodies can avoid uncontrolled
outbreaks altogether. We further considered interventions that delivered additional isolation
beds, personal protective equipment, and health care workers, but the probability of outbreak
control was not meaningfully affected, indicating that in these model scenarios the health
care resources were not a limiting factor (see Other interventions in Papua New Guinea in S1
Methods).
Discussion
Here we discuss our modelling results from the perspective of EVD in the Asia Pacific region,
and more general lessons for mathematical modelling of EID outbreaks in data-poor settings.
EVD in an Asia Pacific context
We have shown how the use of a stochastic model of infection and medical and social interven-
tions can be used to support risk assessment and epidemic preparedness in the presence of lim-
ited data concerning the pathogen, the population, and available health care infrastructure.We
have demonstrated how, over a range of likely country- and disease-specificscenarios, the
probability of controlling an EVD outbreak is dependent on early detection and ongoing ascer-
tainment. We have also shown that, in specific settings (such as the Papua New Guinea case
study), the relative merits of different resourcing strategies may shift. For example, sensitivity
analyses for the rural regions of PNG indicated that interventions targeting behavioural
change, such as changes to burial practices, consistently improve controllability. However, pro-
viding extra hospital beds alone is unlikely to confer substantial benefits because the limiting
factor is case ascertainment rather than treatment and isolation of cases. These observations
are of course specific to this population and health care system context, and a strength of this
framework is the ability to tailor intervention priorities to specific local context.
We can also make several more general observations. Changes in socialmixing and burial
practices, where the population is amenable to such interventions, can reduce transmission
substantially and greatly increase the likelihoodof control. This demonstrates the critical
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importance of effectively communicating infection control and hygiene measures to the com-
munity, and of establishing public trust in the health care system. Similarly, the provision of
additional health care resources can increase the chance of control, but only if the existing
infrastructure is the limiting factor in controlling an outbreak.
With regard to timing of interventions, social interventions and health care strengthening
can be effective even when delivered several weeks after an outbreak has been detected, when
the existing health care system is sufficient to accommodate patients in those early weeks. On
the other hand, reactive strengthening of surveillance systems is likely to be ineffective: case
Fig 10. Effect of behavioural interventions in Port Moresby region.The effect of reducing the force of infection in the community and/or
from dead bodies by 25%, in the urban population of Port Moresby where community transmission is high.When case ascertainment is
40% or higher, reducing transmission in both settings has a synergistic effect on outbreak control.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g010
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ascertainmentmust be high from the start of the outbreak in order to effectively improve
chances of control.
For future EVD outbreaks, vaccination is also likely to play a critical role in any response
effort [46]. While we have not considered the effect of an EVD vaccine in this study, the model
framework is amenable to such extension. Key questions to be addressed would then concern
the ability of health agencies to obtain and distribute vaccines in an optimal fashion. In the
event that a new infectious disease appears, however, vaccine availability cannot be expected
Fig 11. Effect of behavioural interventions in Southern region.The effect of reducing the force of infection in the community and/or from
dead bodies by 25%, in the rural population of the Southern regionwhere community transmission is low. When transmission is reduced in
both settings, the overall force of infection is sufficiently low that uncontrolled outbreaks never occur.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005018.g011
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for many months and effective responses will necessarily rely upon health care infrastructure
and social interventions as modelled in this study.
The benefits of an effective surveillance system are broader than merely improving detection
[47]. As well as enabling a more timely response to theWest African EVD outbreak, an estab-
lished surveillance system would have provided earlier and more accurate information on
the number, location and characteristics of cases. It is plausible to reason that an established
surveillance system could also play a role in communication with affected populations, improv-
ing efforts to modify social behaviour and increasing the trust of populations in health care
systems.
It is instructive to compare our results with the qualitative risk assessment undertaken by
WHO offices in September 2014, which focused on Pacific Island countries [14]. The assess-
ment identified 3 scenarios:
1. A single case of EVD: due to relative low levels of travel between the Pacific and West
Africa;
2. A localized cluster due to transmission in a health facility or social contacts. The assessment
noted ‘If an imported case occurs, the chance of limited secondary transmission would be
moderate to high. Frontline health workers, patients, health facility visitors and social con-
tacts would likely be exposed’; and
3. Widespread and intense transmission. The assessment noted ‘Even if there is a localized
cluster, the chance of progression to widespread and intense transmission of EVD in the
Region would be very low, as there would need to be undetected cases of EVD in the com-
munity. As EVD is severe, most cases would present to a health facility for treatment’ [14].
Our mathematical modelling identified and clarified conditions for fade-out of a small clus-
ter, and controlled and uncontrolled outbreaks. This clarifies the potential connection between
what theWHO assessment refers to as ‘localized clusters’ and ‘widespread transmission’.
While theWHO assessment identifies the need for clinician awareness, case definition, triage
and precautions for cases, our model also highlights the importance of secondary contact trac-
ing and case ascertainment in limiting further spread. Ourmodelling demonstrates that the
risk of extending to widespread transmission is not negligible, and that the presentation of
cases to health facilities would not in and of itself necessarily improve control. In agreement
with the APSED strategy recommendations, our results highlight the critical importance of
early detection and high ascertainment for EID control [19]. Preemptive strengthening of sur-
veillance systems in this region is therefore of paramount importance.
A further use of mathematical models is to provide estimates of population and health care
system impact that can serve as the basis for estimates of the economic impact of an EVD out-
break in the Asia-Pacific region [48]. Potential economic costs include not only the increased
health costs and reduced labour productivity during the outbreak, but also the permanent
reductions in a country’s population and labour force due to mortality, and behavioural effects
induced by the outbreak such as reductions in international tourism and crowd-avoidance
behaviour by a country’s residents. An estimate of these economic costs can inform the deci-
sions that international agencies make about the benefits of intervention and health care sys-
tem support.
There are several limitations to the generality of our results. As recognised above, health
care system data is often of variable quality in many countries. In particular, such data are typi-
cally not available at a high spatial resolution, which is likely to hide considerable geographic
heterogeneity in health care system quantity, quality and access. We have dealt with this limita-
tion by exploring a range of potential health care system resourcing levels, but the availability
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of more accurate data would improve the quality of model scenarios. Furthermore, our model-
ling approach embodies particular assumptions about disease transmission characteristics that
may only partially reflect the dynamics of any specific EID outbreak. For example, increased
variability (‘overdispersion’) in the number of secondary cases that a primary case generates
may lead to an overestimate in the risk of an outbreak occurring [37] (see Over-dispersion in
secondary cases in S1 Methods).
Lessons for EIDmodelling in data-poor settings
We can identify several general principles from this modelling study that can be used to inform
decisionmaking in data-poor settings.
A basic understanding of the pathogen is necessary to inform the model structure (i.e., to
identify the disease-related compartments and the flows between them).Where disease trans-
mission involves a separate vector (e.g., mosquitoes) or source (e.g., contaminated waterways),
the model will require further compartments to capture these qualities. Model parameters may
be informed by data from previous or related outbreaks, although such values should be vali-
dated as data for the novel pathogen become available.
In the absence of data beyond basic population demographics, expert local knowledge is
critical for estimating available health care infrastructure, relevant socio-cultural behaviours
that may influence disease transmission, and subsequent behavioural changes instigated by the
perceived threat or by communications (e.g., community hygiene promotion). The inherent
uncertainties in these factors highlights the importance of thorough sensitivity analyses, rather
than relying on ‘best available’ point estimates [49].
Once the diseasemodel has been defined and calibrated to the target population and health
care system, the next challenge is to design a range of simulation scenarios that admit interven-
tions and resourcing levels that are realistic in both scope and timeliness. Possible sources of
guidance include previous outbreaks experiencedby the target population, and previous for-
eign-aid efforts. For comparison against these scenarios, a set of simulations with no health
care response should be generated to form a baseline.
Finally, it is important to determine how best to classify and communicate the epidemic
outcomes generated by the model. Communication of key model outcomes to policymakers
and local health care providers must be both accurate and comprehensible. Given the consider-
able uncertainty around model inputs in data-poor settings, it is important that specific quanti-
tative outputs are not ‘over-interpreted’. For example, projections of cumulative cases are
unlikely to be realised given both initial uncertainty, and the evolving nature of the local and
international response and intervention.We therefore advocate focusing on qualitative mea-
sures of control and burden that can inform estimates of comparative, rather than absolute,
impact. Our classification of outbreaks as either controlled or uncontrolled was appropriate in
the case of EVD, since there was a clear division between epidemic sizes. It is possible that fur-
ther distinctionsmay be required in other scenarios.
Despite the paucity of social, demographic and health care system data that is available for
understudied countries, mathematical modelling can enable rapid assessment of risk across a
range of country and intervention scenarios, to assist with prioritisation of EID preparedness
and response efforts.
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